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Abstract
The article analyzes Taiwan’s legitimacy debate over trade negotiations with China. The theo-
retical concept of legitimacy is used to assess Taiwan’s cross-straits negotiation mechanism and
trade agreements. This article argues that Taiwan’s current legal framework governing con-
gressional supervision of cross-straits agreements falls short of procedural legitimacy and per-
formance legitimacy. By explaining the constitutional design for Taiwan’s ‘‘white glove’’
mechanism, the article explores the initial procedural legitimacy deficit. As cross-straits nego-
tiations involve increasingly substantive obligations, the legitimacy of bilateral agreements has
changed fundamentally. The massive protest of the Sunflower Movement due to the Services
Trade Agreement reinforced legitimacy concerns. Taiwan’s ambiguous congressional review
procedures and negative public perception undermine the performance legitimacy of cross-
straits agreements. Notwithstanding the conclusion of free trade agreements with Singapore
and New Zealand, Taiwan’s domestic political impasse will jeopardize its efforts to integrate into
regional free trade agreements. Hence, the legitimacy of Taiwan’s law and politics regarding
cross-straits negotiations will have a profound impact on its cross-straits and foreign trade
policies.
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Introduction
Improved relations between China and Taiwan have rapidly accelerated cross-straits
economic integration since the inauguration of Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou. The
Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) marked a political
milestone. The ECFA not only constructed a legal framework for a prospective cross-
straits free trade agreement (FTA), but also changed the long-standing mode of ‘‘non-
official’’ negotiations in light of sovereign disputes. Yet, the massive protest against the
Cross-Straits Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in Taiwan intensified constitutional
and political tensions over the legitimacy of the country’s trade negotiations with China.1
These developments are critical to Taiwan, China, and the Asia-Pacific.
The article examines Taiwan’s legitimacy debate over cross-straits economic rela-
tions. The unique nature of bilateral negotiation mechanisms and agreements underlies
Taiwan’s legitimacy controversies, which are intertwined with cross-straits politics and
FTA policy. This article argues that Taiwan’s current legal framework that governs
congressional supervision of cross-straits agreements lacks procedural legitimacy and
performance legitimacy. The second section provides a theoretical framework for the
multifaceted concept of legitimacy and identifies the research question in context. The
third section discusses the ‘‘white glove’’ mechanism that made China–Taiwan negotia-
tions feasible given their mutual non-recognition based on their respective interpretations
of the one-China policy. The fourth section addresses the public demand for enhanced
congressional supervision over cross-straits agreements amid the 2014 Sunflower Move-
ment’s unprecedented 24-day occupation of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY or Con-
gress).2 The fifth section concludes by analyzing legal and political implications.
Theoretical concepts
This article focuses on Taiwan’s legitimacy tensions over two key aspects of cross-
straits trade negotiations: the negotiation mechanisms and cross-straits agreements.
It shows the challenges to legal validity and political legitimacy in Taiwan’s
democratization. To develop a theoretical framework, the article first explores the
concept of legitimacy, which is traditionally prevalent in legal and political science
discourse. The notion of legitimacy is paramount to examining Taiwan’s mechanism
to deal with cross-straits trade negotiations and agreements as democratized society
has demanded further transparency and accountability. In particular, analyzing the
distinction between procedural and performance aspects of legitimacy is of sig-
nificance to understanding polarized cross-straits politics.
1. Fujuda Madoka, ‘‘Japan–China–Taiwan Relations after Taiwan’s Sunflower Move-
ment,’’ Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 264 (2014); David G. Brown and Kevin Scott,
‘‘China–Taiwan’s Relations: A Breakthrough and a Deadlock, Comparative Connections,’’
May 2014, available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/1401qchina_taiwan.pdf
2. Michael J. Cole, ‘‘Sunflowers End Occupation of Taiwan’s Legislature,’’ The Diplomat, 11
April 2014, available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/sunflowers-end-occupation-of-
taiwans-legislature/
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Legitimacy is a subjective and non-static norm because it evolves through the his-
torical and emotional changes in civil society.3 While legitimacy encompasses values
such as morality, democracy, or justice, diverse definitions of legitimacy and approaches
to assessing legitimate practices remain.4 Legitimacy is distinguishable from legality,
which is often based on the state’s interpretation of positive law. While legality denotes
conformity with the binding rules of a political entity, legitimacy refers to the normative
perception of whether such rules should be observed.5
It is recognized that ‘‘legitimacy concerns first and foremost the right to govern.’’6
Without resorting to normative criteria, Max Weber asserted that ‘‘the basis of every
system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief,
a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.’’7 In other
words, the fundamental elements that underpin political legitimacy include citizens’
faith in governmental power to impose orders and their corresponding obligations to
carry out such orders.8 This command–obedience relationship implies consent or rec-
ognition of authority, which forms an indispensable condition for the right to govern.9
Such consent, which reflects the generalized perception, is not limited to the will of rule-
makers and rule-followers.10 Rightful membership qualified to evaluate legitimacy
3. Vesselin Popovski, ‘‘Legality and Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals,’’ in
Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Vesselin Popovski (eds), Legality and Legitimacy
in Global Affairs (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 388–389; Jean Marc
Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and
Political Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 20–21.
4. Michael Barnett and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘‘From International Relations to Global Society,’’ in
Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International
Relations (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 68; Lorraine Elliott, ‘‘Legality
and Legitimacy: The Environmental Challenge,’’ in Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer, and
Vesselin Popovski (eds), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2012), p. 368.
5. Christine Chinkin, ‘‘Rethinking Legality/Legitimacy after the Iraq War,’’ in Richard Falk,
Mark Juergensmeyer, and Vesselin Popovski (eds), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 220–221; Antonio Cassese, ‘‘The
Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of International
Criminal Justice,’’ Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, No. 491 (2012), pp. 491–492.
6. Jean Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right
and Political Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 10.
7. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, NY: The Free
Press, 1964), p. 382.
8. Zheng Yongnian and Lye Fook Liang, ‘‘Political Legitimacy in Reform China: Between
Economic Performance and Democratization,’’ in Lynn White (ed.) Legitimacy: Ambiguities
of Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia (Singapore:World Scientific, 2005).
9. Jean Marc Coicaud, Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right
and Political Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 13–14.
10. Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1998); Lorraine Elliott, ‘‘Legality and Legitimacy: The Environmental Challenge,’’ in
Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Vesselin Popovski (eds), Legality and Legitimacy
in Global Affairs (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 368–369.
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includes any stakeholders who are affected by rules. Legitimacy thus ensures voluntary
compliance without utilizing external means of coercion, and, consequently, decreases
the social and political costs of governance.
Irrespective of divergent views on legitimacy, it is undisputed that a government or
rule gains legitimacy by demonstrating compliance with correct procedures along with
appropriate objectives.11 To provide for normative assessment, this article divides the
legitimacy discussion into procedural and performance aspects of legitimacy. Procedural
legitimacy or input legitimacy is embedded in Western democracies and gained pro-
minence in Taiwan, which has undergone rapid democratization since the lifting of
martial law in 1987.12 The procedural justice concept centers on whether an outcome is
derived from legitimate institutions and legal procedures.13 Notably, procedural legiti-
macy is intertwined with legality, but it is not confined to legal rules that make policy
decisions legitimate.14 Procedural legitimacy thus lies at the heart of the transparency
and accountability of the decision-making process that warrants democratic represen-
tation and effective participation.15 Such legitimacy is vital to cross-straits negotiations,
which inevitably concern issues of constitutionality and sovereignty.
While procedural legitimacy appraises whether collective decisions are reached in a
politically correct way, performance legitimacy or output legitimacy assesses if such
decisions are acceptable in the eyes of the stakeholders. Performance legitimacy is
validated on the basis of prescribed societal goals and practical outcomes that reflect the
public assessment of institutional functions.16 The types of outcomes may include
government effectiveness and responsiveness to increasing public welfare and economic
11. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, ‘‘Elaborating the ‘New Institutionalism,’’’ in Robert E.
Goodin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Science (New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2011), p. 166; Zheng Yongnian and Lye Fook Liang, ‘‘Political Legitimacy in Reform
China: Between Economic Performance and Democratization,’’ in Lynn White (ed.),
Legitimacy: Ambiguities of Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia
(Singapore: World Scientific, 2005), p. 188.
12. Shelly Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (New York, NY: Routledge,
1999), p. 128.
13. Martin E. Spencer, ‘‘Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority,’’ British Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1970), pp. 123, 127–128.
14. Valerie Dye, ‘‘Targeting Source and Addressing Plurality in European Union Legitimacy:
Procedure versus Substance,’’ Political Perspective, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2008), pp. 2–7.
15. Jenny de Fine Lichet, ‘‘Do We Really Want to Know: The Potentially Negative Effect of
Transparency in Decision Making on Perceived Legitimacy,’’ Scandinavian Political
Science, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2011), pp. 183, 186–188; Lorraine Elliott, ‘‘Legality and
Legitimacy: The Environmental Challenge,’’ in Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer, and
Vesselin Popovski (eds), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 378–379.
16. Lorraine Elliott, ‘‘Legality and Legitimacy: The Environmental Challenge,’’ in Richard
Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Vesselin Popovski (eds), Legality and Legitimacy in Global
Affairs (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 380–381; Christopher A.
Thomas, ‘‘The Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law,’’ Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2014), pp. 729, 751–752.
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development. The standards of performance legitimacy consistently evolve so that
public demands can be met.
A government or rule short of legitimacy results in a democratic deficit. A question
arises as to when procedural legitimacy converges and diverges with performance
legitimacy. Weber asserted that ‘‘the most common form of legitimacy is the belief in
legality, the compliance with enactments which are formally correct and which have
been made in the accustomed manner.’’17 Weber’s legal-rational legitimacy suggests
that political legitimacy is deemed to be established so long as a collective decision
meets the requirement of laws or procedures. Carl Schmitt, among others, argued that
exceptional political and economic circumstances render legality and legitimacy bifur-
cated.18 In other words, a rule made in compliance with procedures per se may not justify
its legitimacy. Evolving legitimacy, in turn, helps close the gap between general per-
ception and rules, and contributes to progressive developments in positive law.19
The article examines why and whether the cross-straits negotiation mechanism and
resultant trade agreements meet the requirements of procedural and performance
legitimacy. By focusing on Taiwan’s law and politics, this article explores political
challenges to Taipei’s trade negotiations with Beijing. The legitimacy debate on eco-
nomic relations with China demonstrates the influence of shifting legitimacy on Tai-
wan’s institutional mechanism governing cross-straits affairs.
Extraordinary cross-straits negotiations
The post-civil war division of ‘‘old’’ China between the Republic of China (ROC) on
Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has created legal and political
dilemmas. While it is constitutionally infeasible for them to ‘‘recognize’’ each other, the
inevitable contact has enabled both sides to develop extraordinary mechanisms for
bilateral negotiations since the 1990s. The legitimacy of the so-called ‘‘white glove’’
mechanism under Taiwan’s constitutional order became an important topic in demo-
cratic politics and cross-straits negotiations.
The evolution of the ‘‘white glove’’ mechanism
The ‘‘Three No’s’’ policy of Taiwan’s ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), which
maintained no contact, made no compromises, and held no negotiations with the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), had prevented cross-straits talks for decades. This policy
encountered pragmatic challenges when dealing with Beijing on hijacking and illegal
immigration issues. In 1983, the crash of a Taiwan military transport aircraft near Fujian
17. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology Vol. 1. (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1978), p. 37.
18. Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004),
pp. 4–29.
19. Vesselin Popovski and NicholasTurner, ‘‘Conclusion: Legitimacy as Complement and
Corrective to Legality,’’ in Richard Falk, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Vesselin Popovski.
(eds), Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2012), pp. 440–441.
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Province led to the first post-1949 contact when China transported the corpses of Tai-
wanese crew members to Kinmen Island.20 The 1986 incident was more complex.
Taiwan’s China Airlines cargo plane was hijacked by its captain, who proceeded to land
the plane in Guangzhou.21 To avoid ‘‘official’’ contact, Taipei requested that China
Airlines negotiate the transfer of the plane with PRC authorities.22 In 1990, a rapidly
increasing number of illegal Chinese immigrants to Taiwan prompted the two sides to
conclude the first cross-straits agreement, the Kinmen Agreement.23 In the absence of
government agencies in charge of cross-straits negotiations on both sides, the agreement
was concluded between their respective Red Cross associations. These pragmatic issues
marked the prelude to cross-straits talks, albeit under the guise of their ‘‘private’’ nature.
After Lee Teng-hui assumed Taiwan’s presidency in 1988, his administration decided
to set up a specialized institution to deal with inevitable, wide-ranging cross-straits
affairs. In 1991, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) was established as a ministry
under the Executive Yuan.24 Nonetheless, direct communications between the MAC and
Beijing would violate Taipei’s Three No’s policy, which prohibited official contact. It
became necessary to have a non-governmental organization (NGO) facilitate ‘‘non-
official’’ cross-straits talks. The Taiwanese government set up the Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF) as a semi-official, intermediary institution.25 The SEF thus became a
government-funded NGO that conducts cross-straits negotiations under the MAC-
mandated policy.
China was initially puzzled by Taiwan’s double-layered mechanism. Under its one-
China trajectory, Beijing’s preferred negotiation approach would be CCP–KMT dialo-
gues rather than intergovernmental talks. The PRC nonetheless altered its stance because
it intended to seize the opportunity to negotiate with Taipei and to break through the
Three No’s policy.26 In Beijing’s view, promoting ‘‘three links’’ (i.e. direct postal,
transportation and trade) would benefit its economic reform and ultimate reunification.
Therefore, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) under the PRC State Council established the
semi-official Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) in 1991. The
20. Zheng Jian, Chao Qi Chao Luo: Hai Xie Hui Hai Ji Hui Jiao Liu Jiao Wang Ji Shi [Turn of
the Tide: Records of Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF)–Association for Relations Across
the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) Exchanges and Relations] (Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2013),
pp. 19–20.
21. Ibid., p. 21.
22. Ibid., pp. 23–25.
23. ‘‘Red Cross Signatories Observe Kinmen Agreement Anniversary,’’ China Post, 22
September 2010, available at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/local/offshore-islands/
2010/09/22/273507/Red-Cross.htm
24. Su Chi, Liang An Bo Tao: Er Shi Nian Ji Shi [Cross-Straits Waves: Records of 20 Years]
(Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing, 2014), p. 16.
25. Liu Chien-pin, ‘‘Conflict of Interest and Value: An Analysis of Negotiations between
Taiwan and China, 1992–1998,’’ International Negotiations, Vol. 16, No. 249 (2011),
pp. 249–251.
26. Ou Yang Sheng En, Zui Jian, Bai Shou Tao: Hai Ji Hui 2000 Ri [Good Byes, White Gloves:
2000 Days at the SEF] (Taipei: Cite Publishing, 1997), pp. 209–210.
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ARATS serves as the contact point for Taiwan’s SEF. The SEF–ARATS mechanism
enables substantive negotiations without direct contact, which may constitute implied
recognition as a result of government-to-government talks. This structure, commonly
referred to as the ‘‘white glove’’ mechanism, has since become the standard channel for
cross-straits negotiations.
The fluctuation of cross-straits politics has inevitably influenced the effectiveness of
the SEF–ARATS mechanism. A notable initial success was the 1993 Koo–Wang
meeting, which took place in Singapore under the mediation of Singapore’s former
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew.27 The summit between the heads of the SEF and the
ARATS, Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, concluded four agreements that institutio-
nalized subsequent meetings.28 Yet, the second Koo–Wang meeting never took place
because of Beijing’s protest against Lee’s ‘‘two-state theory,’’ in which he characterized
ROC–PRC ties as special state-to-state relations pursuant to Taiwan’s constitutional
amendments.29
The suspension of bilateral talks continued during the presidential tenure of Chen
Shui-bian of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The SEF–
ARATS mechanism was only revived after Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT was elected
Taiwan’s president. Of the 21 agreements that the Ma administration entered into with
China between 2008 and 2014, the ECFA was the most significant one.30 The ECFA not
only constructed a legal framework for a prospective FTA, but also resulted in a political
spillover effect. It has advanced direct negotiations by establishing the Cross-Straits
Economic Cooperation Committee (EEC) to include government officials from both
sides when negotiating post-ECFA agreements, such as the CSSTA.
The legal framework
Procedural legitimacy, often conflated with legality, denotes compliance with existing
procedures enacted by a political entity, whereas performance legitimacy may lie in
various factors and changes constantly. The procedural legitimacy of the white glove
mechanism is a fundamental aspect of cross-straits trade negotiations and symbolizes the
shift of Taiwan’s China policy.
Taiwan’s constitution is based on the 1947 ROC Constitution that the National
Assembly ratified in Nanjing. As congressional members represented the ‘‘whole’’
China, they could not envision the dilemma of a divided state. As it is constitutionally
27. Fang Peng-Cheng, Taiwan Hai Ji Hui De Gu Shi [The Story of Taiwan’s SEF] (Taipei:
Commercial Press, 2005), pp. 174–175.
28. Ken Wang Qingxin, ‘‘Taiwanese NGOs and the Prospect of National Reunification in
the Taiwan Strait,’’ Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2000),
pp. 111–115.
29. Philip C. Sauders and Scott L. Kastner, ‘‘Bridge over TroubledWater? Envisioning a China–
Taiwan Peace Agreement,’’ International Security, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2009), pp. 87, 92–93.
30. Lowell Dittmer, ‘‘Taiwan’s Narrowing Strait: A Triangular Analysis of Taiwan’s Security
since 2008,’’ in Peter C.Y. Chow (ed.), The US Strategic Pivot to Asia and Cross-Strait
Relations: Economic and Security Dynamics (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014),
pp. 1520–1521.
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infeasible for Taiwan to recognize the PRC as a foreign country, legal constraints pre-
vented the creation of mechanisms for cross-straits negotiations. The MAC and the SEF
only became possible after Taiwan passed Additional Articles to the original constitution
to reflect political reality. The constitutional amendments define one China as the ROC’s
‘‘free area’’ and the ‘‘Mainland area,’’ and confine the application of constitutional rights
to the former.31 As Additional Articles delegate legislative power to regulate cross-straits
matters, the LY enacted the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan
Area and the Mainland Area (Cross-Straits Statute) in 1992.
Based on these constitutional amendments, the Cross-Straits Statute justifies the leg-
ality of the MAC and the SEF. The statute mandates that the MAC be Taiwan’s sole
government agency for cross-straits affairs. Furthermore, it authorizes the MAC to
‘‘entrust’’ NGOs to conclude agreements in order to avoid official contact under the Three
No’s policy.32 Thus, the Executive Yuan donated US$20.8 million to contribute to the
birth of the SEF.33 The SEF’s operating expenses have also continued to depend on the
government budget. According to the statute, the MAC possesses the authority to ‘‘instruct
and supervise’’ the SEF as to its competence to execute agreements with China.34
Taiwan Affairs
Office (TAO),
PRC State
Council
Mainland
Affairs Council
(MAC), ROC
Executive Yuan
Association for
Relations Across
the Taiwan
Straits (ARATS)
Straits Exchange
Foundation
(SEF)
Cross-Straits
Economic
Cooperation
Committee
Figure 1. The evolution of the cross-straits negotiation mechanism based on the organizational
charters of the ARATS and the SEF and the ECFA.
31. Additional Articles, Constitution of the Republic of China (‘‘ROC Constitution’’), art. 11.
32. Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area
(Cross-Straits Statute), art. 4.
33. The initial fund of the SEF was NT$670 million (US$26.8 million). Ou Yang Sheng En, Zai
Jian, Bai Shou Tao: Hai Ji Hui 2000 Ri [Good Byes, White Gloves: 2000 Days at the SEF]
(Taipei: Cite Publishing, 1997), p. 20.
34. Cross-Straits Statute, art. 4-3.
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In comparison, the legality of China’s TAO and ARATS may be questionable due to
the ambiguity of their legal basis. Under its 1982 Constitution, Taiwan remains part of
the PRC’s ‘‘sacred territory’’ pending reunification.35 The 2005 Anti-Secession Law
indicates that cross-straits consultations and negotiations should be conducted on an
equal basis.36 It thus implicitly recognizes the legality of governmental mechanisms that
deal with the ROC, a regime that Beijing declines to recognize. Neither the Constitution
nor the law details the status and the structure of the TAO and the ARATS. In practice,
the highest decision-making power lies in the CCP Central Leading Group for Taiwan
Affairs, where the CCP Secretary-General (also the President of the PRC) serves as the
leader. The Taiwan Work Office of the CCP Central Committee and the TAO represent
the Communist Party and the Chinese government, respectively. These two institutions
are technically independent but share the same compositions and premises under the
concept of the ‘‘same people under the two signboards.’’37 Absent clear legal instru-
ments, this structural design reflects CCP-led Taiwan policy and functions more ‘‘effi-
ciently’’ than Taiwan’s mechanism, which often encounters institutional tensions.
Legitimacy concerns
In the pre-Sunflower Movement era, legitimacy issues of the MAC–SEF design that
resulted in the white glove mechanism were limited. Legitimacy concerns about Taiwan’s
government structure centered on procedural legitimacy, which focuses on transparency,
accountability, and democratic representation. The deficits of procedural legitimacy were
arguably remedied by legal amendments that enlarged congressional supervision of the
MAC and the SEF. Prior to the ECFA, performance legitimacy did not attract public
attention because of the narrow scope of the ‘‘outcome’’ of cross-straits negotiations. As
most initial agreements were technical in nature and did not influence most Taiwanese
people, discussions about the right to govern based on public consent were rare. In con-
trast, legitimacy concerns escalated to new levels in the post-Sunflower Movement era.
The lack of both procedural legitimacy and performance legitimacy surfaced as defi-
ciencies in Taiwan’s legal framework on the congressional role in cross-straits agreements.
The creation of the SEF was due to Taiwan’s Three No’s policy. Based on the Cross-
Straits Statute, the MAC designated power to the SEF, a ‘‘private’’ NGO, to conduct
negotiations with China. A dilemma soon emerged in the 1990s as to whether, and to
what extent, the legislative and executive branches could legally supervise the SEF’s
operation. In this regard, procedural legitimacy begs the question of legality. Taiwan’s
LY realized that its direct supervision over the SEF would be constitutionally infeasible
because the SEF structurally resides outside the government framework. Congressional
power to review budgetary bills only applies to the MAC, rendering SEF budgets ‘‘free’’
from the LY’s control, despite the fact that the SEF is based on government funding.38
35. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (‘‘PRC Constitution’’), preamble.
36. PRC Anti-Secession Law, art. 7.
37. Su Chi, Liang An Bo Tao: Er Shi Nian Ji Shi [Cross-Straits Waves: Records of 20 Years]
(Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing, 2014), p. 19.
38. ROC Constitution, art. 63.
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Although LY committees ‘‘may invite governmental officials and private persons’’ to
address questions at congressional meetings, SEF officials rarely succumb to such
requests.39 Making laws that are specifically applicable to the SEF alone would even
violate the doctrine of legal equality, which requires all private foundations, including
the SEF, to be governed in the same way.
An intertwined challenge was the extent to which the LY could indirectly supervise
the SEF through the MAC. This issue hinges upon the legal relations between the MAC
and the SEF. In the PRC, no conflict between the TAO and the ARATS has arisen
irrespective of the latter’s ‘‘independent’’ status. The two institutions strictly follow
the CPC’s direction and can interchangeably act as government officials or private
representatives depending on Taiwanese counterparts. Such flexibility is largely
confined in Taiwan because law in the democratic system needs to ensure the auton-
omy of an NGO. Consequently, the SEF’s and the MAC’s division of work and dif-
ferent approaches to Beijing resulted in internal inefficiency in cross-straits
negotiations in the early days. The SEF preferred the proactive top-down approach in
favor of comprehensive talks on diverse topics.40 The MAC instead adopted a con-
servative stance and focused on functional, low-politics matters in order to build
mutual political trust.
In practice, the SEF’s negotiation leverage was often undermined by external pressure
from the ARATS and the internal restrictions imposed by the MAC. The ARATS and
TAO follow the same mandate from the CCP. While facing the Taiwanese delegates, the
ARATS possesses great flexibility in the bargaining process. Nevertheless, the SEF is
accountable to the MAC and the LY’s multiparty interest groups. The SEF is often
confined by the MAC’s preset bottom lines and cannot effectively respond to its Beijing
counterpart’s requests in key issues.
In order to address the legitimacy concerns about the SEF’s operation, the leg-
islators introduced legal amendments to strengthen the MAC–SEF framework and to
accord the LY more power in cross-straits policymaking. The MAC has a vertical
supervisory and horizontal entrust-agency relationship with the SEF. Legislation
mandates that as a regulatory authority, the MAC possesses overall responsibility to
‘‘direct and supervise’’ the SEF.41 Furthermore, the MAC–SEF entrust contract
obliges the SEF to carry out contractual terms with due diligence and to report to the
MAC.42 As China affairs are intra-ministerial in nature, other ministries governing
national defense and foreign affairs also concluded entrust contracts with the SEF.
These administrative and contractual obligations remedy the deficits of procedural
legitimacy by making the SEF a de facto government agency and enhancing con-
gressional supervision.
39. Ibid., art. 67.
40. Ou Yang Sheng En, Zui Jian, Bai Shou Tao: Hai Ji Hui 2000 Ri [Good Byes, White Gloves:
2000 Days at the SEF] (Taipei: Cite Publishing, 1997), pp. 118–121.
41. Cross-Straits Statute, arts 4–5; Civil Code, art. 32; Organization Act of the Mainland Affairs
Council of the Executive Yuan, art. 3.
42. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)–SEF Entrust Contract, art. 6.
10 Political Science
 by guest on January 16, 2016pnz.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
The CSSTA and the Sunflower Movement
As previous sections explain, legitimacy concerns before the ECFA centered on pro-
cedural legitimacy instead of performance legitimacy. Procedural legitimacy concerns
about the white glove mechanism subsided due to the legal amendments that enhanced a
congressional role in the MAC–SEF decision-making process. However, under Ma’s
presidency, legitimacy in cross-straits negotiations has transformed fundamentally. The
expanding scope of post-ECFA negotiations galvanized the demand from the LY and
civic groups for transparency in the actual outcome of negotiations (i.e. trade agree-
ments). Such demands finally provoked the large-scale protest that opposed the CSSTA.
Due to the changing nature of cross-straits agreements, both procedural legitimacy and
performance legitimacy have undermined the authority of Taiwan’s legislation gov-
erning congressional procedures for reviewing such agreements.
Post-ECFA negotiations
The purpose of the ECFA is to construct a framework for a prospective cross-straits FTA.
Categorized as an ‘‘interim agreement’’ under Article XXIV of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the ECFA was concluded between the ARATS and
the SEF under the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework.43 Notwithstanding the
legal nature of the ECFA in the PRC’s and the ROC’s domestic constitutional orders, the
ECFA is an international instrument from the WTO perspective. Although the China–
Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) was also concluded in
compliance with GATT requirements, notable differences exist between the ECFA and
the CEPA. The CEPA explicitly recognized the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ mandate in
the text, placing Hong Kong subordinate to Beijing in the constitutional hierarchy.44 The
ECFA avoided such language. The ECFA also refrained from following the CEPA
model that made anti-dumping and subsidies measures inapplicable and adopted an
ambiguous dispute settlement mechanism. The ECFA aimed to be more legally oriented
and to build the foundation for negotiating subsequent agreements on specific sectors.
The 2013 CSSTA is a post-ECFA agreement that furthers services liberalization.
Prior to the ECFA, Taipei only concluded FTAs with five diplomatic allies in Central
America, including Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. These
FTAs are of political significance but have limited economic effect on Taiwan’s external
trade.45 For Taipei, concluding a trade pact with Beijing will increase Taiwan’s export
market. More importantly, improved cross-straits relations can help Taiwan’s FTA
efforts with foreign countries that try to avoid tensions with China. Since post-ECFA
negotiations are seen to have a direct impact on Taiwan’s investment and employment
market, concerns of procedural legitimacy regarding insufficient congressional super-
vision over the agreements with China have escalated.
43. Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘‘The China–Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law,’’
Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2011), pp. 146–149.
44. Ibid., pp. 139–141.
45. Bureau of Foreign Trade, ‘‘PTT Slides: Challenges v Opportunities—Tasks and Prospects in
Signing ECFA,’’ 2010, p. 15.
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To understand the political challenges provoked by the Sunflower Movement,
understanding the CSSTA is essential. This agreement aims to further liberalize bar-
riers to cross-straits trade in services. As the services sector amounts to 70% of Tai-
wan’s gross domestic product (GDP), the CSSTA became indispensable to achieving
the objective of the ECFA.46 Under the CSSTA, Beijing and Taipei committed to
liberalizing 80 and 64 services sectors, respectively.47 All of China’s commitments
under the CSSTA exceed the WTO level. Half of such WTO-plus commitments are
comparable to or higher than the preferential treatment that China accorded Hong
Kong under the CEPA.48 The level of Taiwan’s commitments to opening its services
market to China is relatively limited.49 While Taiwan’s China-based e-commerce,
banking, and securities industries will benefit from liberalization, the CSSTA will
oblige Taiwan to decrease China-targeted barriers by allowing Chinese enterprises to
enter Taiwan’s services sectors.
Notwithstanding the ‘‘favorable’’ treatment accorded to Taiwan, the CSSTA has
encountered a polarized political stand-off. According to a 2014 poll, 42.5% and 40.1%
of Taiwanese voters support and oppose the pact, respectively.50 Arguably, certain
contentions about the substance of the CSSTA are misleading. Contrary to popular
belief, the scope of the CSSTA is restricted in comparison with Taiwan’s other FTAs.
The agreement allows the entry neither of Chinese laborers nor immigrant investors. It is
true that liberalizing grassroots sectors, such as the laundry, beauty salon, and mortuary
industries, may endanger Taiwan’s small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), hence
undermining the performance legitimacy of the agreement. Nonetheless, this presump-
tion may underestimate these SMEs’ home advantages and overestimate their attraction
to Chinese investors because of the limited market sizes of these sectors. The argument
against the CSSTA’s ‘‘permanent’’ nature is questionable. The ‘‘emergent consulta-
tions’’ provision of the agreement allows for requesting bilateral consultations should
either party’s services sectors encounter ‘‘substantive negative influence.’’51 It also
permits either side to revise or revoke the commitments after the CSSTA is implemented
for three years.52
46. Council for Economic Planning and Development, ‘‘Cross-Strait Trade in Services
Agreement Brings New Business Opportunities,’’ 3 August 2013, available at http://
investintaiwan.nat.gov.tw/eng/news_display.jsp?newsid=2897
47. Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China, ‘‘Interpretation of the Cross-Straits
Agreement in Services by Head of Department of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau
Affairs of MOFCOM,’’ 3 July 2013, available at: http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/
policyrelease/Cocoon/201308/20130800259783.shtml
48. Jing Ji Ri Bao [Economic Daily News], ‘‘Liang An Fu Wu Mao Yi Xie Yi Kai Qi Tai Wan
Xin Ji Hui’’ [‘‘The Cross-Straits Services Trade Agreement (CSSTA) Provides New
Opportunities for Taiwan’’], 22 June 2013, p. 2.
49. Ibid.
50. MAC News Release No. 43, 2014.
51. CSSTA, art. 8.
52. Ibid., art. 17(1).
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The procedural legitimacy deficits of cross-straits agreements
The widespread outcry against the CSSTA revealed problems in Taiwan’s legal
framework governing the conclusion and review of cross-straits agreement and thus
undermined the current system’s procedural legitimacy and performance legitimacy. In
fact, challenges to the CSSTA’s contents were the pretext underlying the protest against
the agreement. What initially provoked the Sunflower Movement was the procedural
legitimacy deficit involving the alleged ‘‘black box’’ review procedures that govern
cross-straits agreements. In turn, the public’s worry about the negative impact of post-
ECFA agreements rose rapidly.
The LY’s constitutional mandate to review cross-straits agreements lies in the legal
nature of such agreements. Existing legal frameworks provide for procedures governing
the congressional ratification of treaties. However, it is controversial whether cross-
straits agreements fall within the ambit of ‘‘treaties’’ under the ROC Constitution.53
This question first arose following the 1993 Koo–Wang meeting as congressional
members requested that the Constitutional Court clarify the definition of ‘‘treaties’’ and
their review procedure in the LY. The Court explained that, notwithstanding titles,
treaties denote international agreements concluded with foreign countries.54 As cross-
straits agreements are not construed as treaties, the Court declined to determine the
congressional role in reviewing such agreements. The judicial declination to offer gui-
dance on the applicable review procedures for cross-straits agreements led to legislative–
executive conflicts.
The procedural challenges to the CSSTA centered on the interpretation of the Cross-
Straits Statute, which includes bifurcated congressional review procedures for cross-
straits agreements depending on their legal nature. Under Article 5 of the statute, if
enforcing an agreement requires legal amendments or new legislation, such an agree-
ment should be submitted to the LY for ‘‘consideration.’’ Otherwise, an agreement needs
only to be submitted to the LY for ‘‘record’’ following the Executive Yuan’s approval.
The consideration–record distinction is of great significance to the legal effect. ‘‘Con-
sideration’’-type agreements will not take effect until the LY has a substantive review
and has ratified them. However, ‘‘record’’-type agreements can become automatically
effective if they are pending in the LY for 90 days.55
Reasons for the public perception over ‘‘black box’’ review procedures are twofold.
First, there are different congressional review procedures, depending on the legal nature
of cross-straits agreements. The legal loophole exists in the executive branch’s sole
power to determine whether an agreement needs legal amendments or new laws. In other
53. ROC Constitution, art. 63.
54. Interpretation No. 329, Council of Grand Justices, Judicial Yuan, 1993.
55. Dai Shi-Ying, ‘‘Liang An Tou Bao Xie Yi He She Sheng Xiao? Lun Liang An Xie Yi Qian
Shu De Sheng Xiao Shi Dian’’ [‘‘When Did the Cross-Straits Bilateral Investment Protection
and Promotion Agreement (BIPPA) Take Place? Discussing the Effective Dates of Con-
cluded Cross-Straits Agreements’’], 30 January 2013, available at: http://www.lawtw.com/
article.php?template¼article_content&area¼free_browse& parent_path¼,1,561,&job_id¼
192664& article_category_id¼2056&article_id¼112490
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words, the government can circumvent congressional scrutiny by categorizing a con-
troversial agreement as one required only for the congressional ‘‘record.’’ The 2008
Cross-Straits Sea Transport Agreement and the 2009 Cross-Straits Air Transport Sup-
plementary Agreement illustrate the problem of the government’s unilateral inter-
pretations of their legal natures.56 The Executive Yuan submitted both agreements to the
LY for record, asserting that they did not require changes to current law. Yet, the tax
authorities found that enforcing tax exemptions under the two agreements would require
a legal basis.57 The two agreements did not become effective until the LY passed
amendments to the Cross-Straits Statute.
Second, the LY itself maintains no consistent approach to reviewing FTAs, including
cross-straits agreements submitted for congressional ‘‘consideration.’’ The review pro-
cedure is usually determined by an ad hoc cross-party consensus. The Taiwan–El Sal-
vador–Honduras FTA and the ECFA were reviewed clause by clause, but voted on as a
package.58 Yet, the Singapore–Taiwan FTA was reviewed and voted on as an entirety
without addressing each provision.59 The DPP requested that the CSSTA be voted on
clause by clause. The KMT opposed this view and argued that the DPP approach would
alter an FTA’s intertwined structure and essentially invalidate the agreement. As recent
cross-straits agreements include more substantive obligations, these anomalies under
legal procedures make procedural legitimacy a serious matter and intensify KMT–DPP
conflicts over trade ties with Beijing.
In March 2014, the ‘‘Chin-Chiang Chang incident’’ incited the outbreak of the
Sunflower Movement, including students’ 24-day occupation of the LY. Before
reviewing the CSSTA, the LY reached a cross-party agreement under which the CSSTA
would be reviewed and voted on article by article.60 Emphasizing that the pact would not
take effect before substantive review, the LY also decided to hold 16 public hearings to
increase transparency.61 Nevertheless, these hearings incurred heavy criticism for failing
to address public concerns. In particular, the eight KMT-held hearings were ‘‘rushed
through’’ in a week. Chin-Chiang Chang of the KMT served as the chair on the LY
56. Gao Xie Wen, ‘‘‘Liang An Xie Yi Guo Hui Jian Du Fa Zhi Hua’ Zuo Tan Hui Hui Hou Xin
Wen Gao (Yi) Lai Chung-Chiang Ti Chu FuMao Xie Yi Gou Hui Shen Cha De Si Yuan Ze’’
[‘‘‘The Legalization of Congressional Supervision over Cross-Straits Agreement’ Meeting
News Release (1), Chung-Chiang Lai Proposed Four Principles of Congressional Review of
the CSSTA’’], News Release, 2 March 2014.
57. Ibid.
58. According to the Legislative Yuan Gazette, Vol. 96, No. 97 (2007), the Taiwan–El Salvador–
Honduras FTA was subject to clause-to-clause review, but the only debate was whether
‘‘Taiwan’’ should be added to the title of the country. The clause-by-clause review of the
ECFA was based on the DPP proposal.
59. Legislative Yuan Gazette, Vol. 103, No. 3 (2014).
60. X-strait.blogspot.tw, ‘‘Annex, Mei Guo Dui Fu Mao Xie Yi He Tai Yang Hua Xue Yun De
Tai Du Ji Qi Yi Han’’ [The US Attitude toward the CSSTA and the Sunflower Student
Movement and its Implications’’], 8 August 2014, available at: http://x-strait.blogspot.tw/
2014/08/blog-post.html
61. Ibid.
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committee in charge of reviewing the CSSTA. Presumably, Chang was under the
executive branch’s pressure to ratify the agreement. Without going through substantive
deliberations, he unexpectedly announced that the CSSTA procedure was ‘‘completed’’
on 17 March 2014.62 He asserted that since the CSSTA had been pending for con-
gressional review for 90 days, the agreement should be deemed to have been reviewed
under existing procedures. This incident immediately incurred public anger and
prompted Taiwan’s political crisis.
As neither the Constitutional Court decision nor the Cross-Straits Statute provides
clear guidance on procedures for reviewing cross-straits agreements, Chang’s
announcement was highly controversial from the perspective of procedural legitimacy.
The public demanded a high degree of scrutiny over the CSSTA, which is perceived to
adversely affect Taiwan’s economy. Arguably, the ‘‘black box’’ review process con-
travenes core components of procedural legitimacy, which mandates democratic rep-
resentation that ensures transparency and accountability. President Ma’s immediate
response was to reject the protestors’ request to withdraw the CSSTA and renegotiate
with Beijing. Legally speaking, the LY’s ratification of the ECFA in 2010 by no means
denotes a ‘‘blank check’’ for subsequent agreements. Each of the post-ECFA agreements
is a free-standing agreement that requires respective congressional approval.
The justification of performance legitimacy
Taiwan’s political debate on the procedure for reviewing and ratifying cross-straits
agreements is distinguishable from that of other countries. FTA discussions usually
center on economic and geopolitical strategies. Washington’s promotion of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP), advocated by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), exemplify
this point. Also, as Australia–China FTA negotiations illustrate, economic dependency is
an essential topic in trade relations with Beijing.63 The difference for Taiwan’s discourse
lies in whether intensifying cross-straits economic ties will be detrimental to the coun-
try’s ‘‘survival.’’ The lack of detailed procedures did not prevent political parties from
reaching a consensus on securitizing and ratifying the FTA with Singapore as a package
deal. Complex political ramifications associated with the unclear legal nature of cross-
straits agreements viewed as ‘‘non-treaties’’ in Taiwan law propelled the congressional
conflicts. This legal limbo has yet to be resolved as the draft law that enhances con-
gressional supervision continues to be pending.
Ma’s refusal to abrogate or redo the CSSTAwas due to the multilayered political risks
of renegotiations, which link to the broader performance legitimacy of cross-straits
agreements. The KMT government’s justification of performance legitimacy was
founded on the impact of FTAs on Taiwan’s economy. The government has promoted
62. Michael J. Cole, ‘‘Taiwanese Occupy Legislature over China Pact,’’ The Diplomat, 20
March 2014, available at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/taiwanese-occupy-legislature-
over-china-pact/
63. Greg Hoy, ‘‘Is Australia Too Dependent on Trade with China?’’ 10 November 2014,
available at: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2014/s4125539.htm
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trade agreements with China for advancing Taiwan’s economic advantages. For instance,
the outcome of the CSSTA will have a direct influence over subsequent negotiations of
tariffs on goods. Due to tariff preferences under FTAs, a higher ‘‘FTA coverage rate’’ (the
ratio of exports shipped to FTA partners) will increase exporting countries’ competitive-
ness in foreign markets. Current FTA coverage rates of Singapore and Korea are 76.5%
and 38.1%, respectively.64 Taiwan’s FTA coverage rate is only 10.38%, but a complete
FTA with China will augment the rate to 23.5%.65 Increasing the ratio of Taiwanese
exports entitled to FTA preferences will be paramount to the country’s economic growth.
Also, it is vital to finalize post-ECFA negotiations because the expected completion of the
Korea–China FTA will soon damage Taiwan’s market share in China.
In the KMT’s view, a noteworthy ‘‘peace dividend’’ effect of cross-straits negotiations
is to accelerate Taiwan’s integration in regional frameworks. Warmer cross-straits rela-
tions have galvanized China to hold a ‘‘no objection’’ view on Taiwan’s FTAs under
Beijing’s one-China policy. After the conclusion of the CSSTA, Taiwan signed FTAs with
New Zealand and Singapore in 2013.66 The two FTAs have salient implications because
neither country has diplomatic relations with the ROC. New Zealand and Singapore are
Taiwan’s 38th and 5th largest trade partners, respectively.67 While New Zealand is Tai-
wan’s first developed-country FTA partner, the Singapore FTAmay lead to Taiwan’s FTA
with other ASEAN countries. These two FTAs built a model for Taiwan’s prospective
trade agreements. While downplaying the political significance of signing formalities,
Taiwan will use its WTO nomenclature ‘‘Separate Customs Territory’’ to conclude FTAs
under the WTO framework.68 Unlike the ECFA’s incremental approach, having a com-
prehensive single-undertaking FTA will be Taipei’s preferred approach.
More profoundly, Taiwan desires to join the multilateral TPP and the RCEP. Both
mega-FTAs will significantly impact global trade rules. The 12-member TPP and the 16-
member RCEP cover 37.5% and 30% of global GDP, respectively.69 FTAs with New
Zealand and Singapore, both members of the TPP or the RCEP, would lay the initial
foundation for Taiwan’s participation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the CSSTA
impasse will lead to a US$21.6 billion loss for Taiwan after the conclusion of the
64. Shih Hui-Tzu, ‘‘Qi Dong Qi Yu Zheng He Xiao Ying De Liang An Huo Huo Xie Yi’’ [‘‘The
TGA that Results in the Effect of Regional Economic Integration’’], Liang An Jing Mao
[Straits Business Monthly], Vol. 266, No. 6 (2014), p. 7.
65. Ibid.
66. Shih Hsiu-Chuan, ‘‘Taiwan, Singapore Sign Free-Trade Pact,’’ Taipei Times, 8
November 2014, available at: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/11/
08/2003576388
67. Value of Exports & Imports by Country, no date, available at: http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/
ENGLISH/FSCE/
68. Pasha L. Hsieh, ‘‘Facing China: Taiwan’s Status as a Separate Customs Territory in the World
Trade Organization,’’ Journal of World Trade, Vol. 39, No. 6 (2005), pp. 1199–1203; Jason
Young, ‘‘Space for Taiwan in Regional Economic Integration: Cooperation and Partnership
with New Zealand and Singapore,’’ Political Science, Vol. 66, No. 1 (2014), pp. 12–17.
69. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations, no date, available at: http://www.dfat.
gov.au/fta/tpp/
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Korea–China FTA.70 The political turmoil has also caused potential FTA partners, such
as Australia and Indonesia, to suspend their plans to enter into substantive negotiations
with Taiwan.71
The Sunflower Movement and the KMT’s landslide defeat in local elections in 2014
undermined the government’s economic justification. Performance legitimacy hinges on
public perception. Undoubtedly, trade agreements with China have benefited Taiwan’s
enterprises, but they only constitute the minority of voters. For the majority of people,
cross-straits agreements have limited effects on remedying Taiwan’s declining GDP
growth. Aggravated by the global economic slowdown, the long-lasting income stag-
nation drove the middle class’ opposition to the CSSTA. University students were
particularly frustrated by the fact that, notwithstanding increasing living costs, the
average monthly salary of college graduates is only US$855.72 The FTAs seem to extend
benefits only to a minority of people at the expense of the majority. The widespread
pessimism about the economic outlook has buttressed the claim that the Ma adminis-
tration ‘‘lied’’ about the effect of FTAs and strengthened the distrust about cross-straits
policy.
A more salient argument against the CSSTA is the increase in economic dependency
on China that may make Taiwan a second Hong Kong. Currently, China-bound trade
accounts for 40% of Taiwan’s exports, whereas US and European markets only con-
stitute 11% and 9% of the island’s exports, respectively.73 Slightly behind Japan, China
also became Taiwan’s second largest source of imports as Chinese exports to Taiwan
constitute 16.4% of the island’s imports.74 Taiwan’s trade surplus with China is valued at
US$77 billion, and the country would run a deficit of US$41 billion if cross-straits trade
was excluded.75 The intensifying cross-straits trade and potential political risks pro-
moted public demand for congressional supervision over the CSSTA. The changing
nature of cross-straits agreements constituted exceptional political and economic cir-
cumstances that provoked legality-legitimacy conflicts. In the context of the CSSTA, the
existing parliamentary review framework can no longer meet the requirements of pro-
cedural and performance legitimacy.
Cross-straits negotiations have encountered the changing nature of political hurdles,
which were further complicated by the Sunflower Movement. To solve the political
70. Amy Chyan, ‘‘China–S. Korea FTA to Hurt Taiwan,’’ China Post, 11 November 2014,
available at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan-business/2014/11/11/421528/China-S-
Korea.htm
71. Liu Jing-Yu, ‘‘Tai Ao FTA Tan Pan Kong Pao Tang’’ [‘‘Taiwan–Australia FTA May Be
Futile’’], China Times, 29 May 2014, available at: http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/
20140529000054-260202
72. Eva Dou and Lorraine Luk, ‘‘In Taiwan, Foxonn Sparks Debate over College Grad Sal-
aries,’’ 15 May 2014, available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/05/15/in-
taiwan-foxconn-sparks-debate-over-college-grad-salaries/
73. William T. Wilson, ‘‘Market Solutions Should Be Central to U.S.’s Taiwan Policy,’’
Backgrounder, No. 2930 (2014), p. 6.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., p. 5.
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stand-off and address the legitimate deficits of the congressional role in reviewing cross-
straits agreements, the LY expects to enact a new law that will strengthen congressional
supervision. The MAC-drafted supervisory bill was based on the Cross-Straits Statutes
with features adopted in the Trade Promotion Authority under US trade law and the
Trade Procedure Act of Korea.76
Through various stages of negotiations, the bill mandates compulsory public hearings
in order to enhance public awareness.77 The National Security Council of the Presi-
dential Office is also charged with the national security review of cross-straits agree-
ments. Distinguishable from US practice, the bill does not allow for congressional
members’ direct participation in negotiations.78 The government explained that unlike
the US Constitution, which bestows trade negotiation power on both legislative and
executive branches, the LY’s constitutional authority is confined to reviewing and
ratifying agreements. Moreover, strengthened congressional supervision at the pre-
signing stage was designed in exchange for obliging the LY to ratify the agreement as
a package rather than vote by individual clauses.
The supervisory bill was submitted to the LY for review in April 2014 but has yet to
be approved. It remains unclear how Taiwan’s presidential election in 2016 will impact
the DPP’s position on the supervisory bill, which is tied to the potential passage or
rejection of the CSSTA. Any drawback in post-ECFA negotiations may negatively
impact FTA talks with Indonesia and Australia and create hurdles for other states to lend
support for Taiwan’s TPP and RCEP membership.
Dealing with democratic Taiwan is a key challenge for China. The Sunflower
Movement galvanized Xi Jinping’s administration to face Taiwan’s civic groups that
represented the emerging ‘‘third’’ power in the island’s two-party system.79 These civic
groups could voice legitimacy concerns about congressional supervision over cross-
straits agreements and could influence prospective Taiwan elections that determine
cross-straits policy. Chinese leadership understood that it would be immature to con-
clude that the student movement indicates Taiwan’s ‘‘anti-China’’ or ‘‘pro-indepen-
dence’’ stance. Yet, it would be too simplistic to rely on the KMT to continue its
China-friendly policy. Beijing will need to engage the population on Taiwan, includ-
ing particularly DPP supporters and those who do not gain the direct economic benefits
of cross-straits agreements. Importantly, the performance legitimacy of cross-straits
negotiations would require Taiwan’s FTAs to expand in tandem with post-ECFA
agreements. To accelerate economic integration with Taiwan, China should be con-
scious of its position on Taiwan’s external FTA efforts.
76. Mainland Affairs Council, ‘‘Information on the Cross-Straits Agreement Supervisory Bill,’’
3 April 2014, available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/lp.asp?ctNode¼7596&CtUnit¼ 5154&
BaseDSD¼7&mp¼210
77. Executive Yuan, ‘‘Executive Yuan Approves Draft Bill on Cross-Strait Agreement Super-
vision,’’ 3 April 2014, available at: http://www.ey.gov.tw/en/News_Content2.aspx?n¼
1C6028CA080A27B3&s¼38451DE4C3084458
78. US Constitution, arts I:8, II:2; ROC Constitution, arts 38, 58, 63, 107.
79. Alan D. Romberg, ‘‘Sunshine Heats Up Taiwan Politics, Affects PRC Tactics,’’ China
Leadership Monitor, No. 2 (2014), pp. 2–5.
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Conclusion
Cross-straits economic ties have been closely intertwined with political challenges. After
the conclusion of the landmark ECFA, the CSSTA provoked intensive constitutional and
political clashes in Taiwan. This article examined Taiwan’s cross-straits negotiation
mechanism and agreements with China under the multifaceted concept of legitimacy.
These legitimate controversies resulted in a significant impact on cross-straits politics and
regional FTAs. To demystify political challenges, the article examined legal and structural
issues from the perspectives of procedural legitimacy and performance legitimacy.
The white glove mechanism based on Taiwan’s Three No’s policy first gave rise to
legitimacy concerns concerning congressional power over the cross-straits negotiation
mechanism. The Cross-Straits Statute based on constitutional amendments remedied the
procedural legitimacy deficits by enhancing the LY’s authority through strengthening
MAC–SEF supervisory relations. Nevertheless, the nature of legitimacy fundamentally
transformed in post-ECFA negotiations because cross-straits agreements incorporate
increasingly substantive obligations that are perceived to harm Taiwan’s politics and
economy. Unable to cope with changes in cross-straits politics, Taiwan’s legal system
that governs the congressional review of trade agreements with China lacks both pro-
cedural legitimacy and performance legitimacy.
The alleged ‘‘black box’’ congressional review procedures for cross-straits agree-
ments led to the Sunflower Movement, which compelled the government to address the
procedural legitimacy deficit. The KMT’s performance legitimacy argument for expe-
diting post-ECFA negotiations was perceived as unconvincing. Stagnant GDP growth
and economic dependency have weakened voters’ support for economic integration with
Beijing. It remains to be seen whether the prospective ratification of the supervisory bill
will converge with public consensus. These political challenges are, in turn, linked to
Taiwan’s bids to expand its FTA network through agreements such as the TPP and the
RCEP. Hence, the legitimacy of law and politics concerning cross-straits agreements
will have a long-lasting impact on Taiwan’s cross-straits and FTA policy.
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